)>IJH=?J Property rights are commonly touted as a solution to common pool resource problems. But in practice the security of these property rights varies substantially owing to dierences in design. In sheries, the design of individual transferable quotas (ITQs) varies widely; the consequences of these design dierences on economic outcomes has not been studied. To test whether the security of these property rights aects asset values, we compile a unique dataset to examine the relationship between the exclusivity of property rights and the dividend price ratios for ITQs. We nd evidence that stronger property rights lead to higher asset values and lower dividend price ratios in ITQ sheries. This pecuniary eect of property rights security informs the current policy debate on the design of property rights institutions for managing natural resources.
). Yet a key insight from early economic analysis, and the focus of our analysis, regards instituting property rights over previously unowned natural resources and how that might mitigate the ill consequences of the common pool. This paper contributes to this broader literature by examining the eect of stronger property rights on investment in common pool resources.
To overcome the problems pervasive in common pool resources (e.g. Gordon, 1954) , rights-based management approaches are increasingly employed globally. Strong evidence of increased economic and ecological performance from rights-based approaches has emerged (Grafton et al., 2000; Costello et al., 2008) , and the policy debate has shifted away from`whether' these approaches are eective and toward questions of design. Many design elements are likely to aect the security of a property right. For example, so-called sunset clauses after which rights are revoked and redistributed will aect stewardship and value (Costello and Kane, 2008) and assignment of rights to only a portion of the resource stock may erode conservation and investment incentives (Deacon et al., 2010) . Other fundamental design parameters include limits on ownership or transferability (Grafton et al., 2000) , revocability, and geographic or temporal control over resource stocks. Despite their ubiquity and importance for design, the extent to which these limitations on property rights security aect behavior and economic value has not been carefully studied. The purpose of this paper is to empirically examine the eect of property rights security on asset values of a globally signicant common pool resource.
In sheries, where the common pool feature has lead to widespread collapse (e.g. Worm et al., 2006) , there is a signicant trend toward property rights-based approaches. Fisheries in developed countries have largely transitioned from open access to limited entry, where the number of vessels is restricted, and often an overall quota is set for all licensed shermen. Under such management, resource rents may still be dissipated in the race to sh and overcapitalization (Homans and Wilen, 1997) . In an attempt to allow the capture of resource rents, some sheries have adopted catch shares or other rights-based management.
In this paper, we focus our analysis exclusively on Individual Transferable Quota (ITQ) sheries. ITQs, a form of`catch shares', are the most prevalent form of shery property right in the industrialized world, where the holder of an ITQ owns an asset which confers the right to harvest a share of the total allowable catch in the present year and into the future. ITQs have been hailed by economists as a means to capture the rents in sheries. But in practice, the design of ITQ systems varies signicantly across sheries; these design idiosyncracies aect property rights security in complex ways.
Under ITQ management, shares of the total allowable catch (TAC) are allocated to individuals (or rms or cooperatives), who then hold the right to harvest their share each year. Typically, the holder of an ITQ can exercise that harvest right, lease it to another sherman, or sell it. This has been shown to help achieve allocative and technical eciency (Grafton et al, 2000) , which adds signicant value in a shery. In addition to eliminating the race to sh, ITQ management has been shown to reverse the collapse of sheries (Costello et al, 2008) .
Since the introduction of the rst ITQs in the mid-1980s in Iceland and New Zealand, ITQ sheries have been established in many countries (prominently the United States, Canada, Peru, Chile, and Australia). The general structure of ITQ management has been adopted widely, but ITQs as property rights are viewed very dierently by governments around the world. In New Zealand, ITQs are viewed as perpetual rights to sh. There, a quota is a legal asset whose owner can use as collateral in establishing credit with banks. On the other hand, in Canada and the United States ITQ ownership is considered a revocable privelege, and the future of ITQ property rights (at least in the long run) is uncertain.
There is also important variation in the security of property rights within countries. Beyond dierences in design features, some stocks are prone to signicant illegal harvest due to high enforcement costs, while highly migratory species are subject to harvest by neighboring jurisdictions or in international waters. Ownership of quota shares in these stocks is arguably less secure than stocks with good enforcement and/or species that stay within the waters of the managing jurisdiction.
This story is not unique to sheries. The deleterious consequences of common pool management of resources such as timber, air, water, and biodiversity are increasingly realized. These declines have lead to the establishment of property rights over these resources. In so doing, governments inevitably wrestle with the dilemma of how much control to cede to private resource owners, where more control confers a stronger property right to its owner.
Economic theory suggests that the strength of property rights should aect the value of the asset itself (in sheries, this is the quota value) but should not aect the current lease value. The lease value simply reects the current year's rents, whereas the sales price of a quota should in principle capitalize future expectations. Quota markets oer a good opportunity to study the eect of more secure property rights on asset values because the relationship between lease prices and sales prices of quota shares should be dictated by market fundamentals. Newell et al (2005) study ITQ markets in New Zealand and nd that markets are suciently thick to operate well; the relationship between lease and sales prices approximately follows market interest rates, and asset values in sheries that experienced signicant rebuilding showed large gains. In a follow-up paper, Newell et al (2007) extend this analysis to a more formal model of asset pricing. They nd that asset prices are higher when interest rates are lower, and asset values are lower for stocks with higher biological uctuation. They also nd that stocks that had large decreases in costs or high growth rates in output prices have higher quota asset prices. These papers contribute signicantly to our understanding of quota markets and asset pricing in sheries, though they do not address the issue of property rights security.
In this paper we exploit dierences in property rights across countries to determine the market implications of secure ownership of these assets. We then exploit variation in the exclusivity of the property right within New Zealand to determine the impact of more secure property rights on the dividend price ratio, a measure of the implied discount rate in asset markets. We nd that property rights security has a signicant eect on asset values in sheries suggesting that property rights security may have a profound impact on economic behavior in (previously) common pool resources.
Background
ITQs allow the capture of resource rents by reducing the race to sh and allowing the price mechanism to move harvest rights to the most ecient shermen. There is, however, considerable variation both across and within countries in the strength of the property rights underlying these assets.
Every country imposes idiosyncratic limitations on trades, duration, and use of ITQ shares, including (but not limited to) caps on ownership of shares, restrictions on ownership by foreign eets, vessel capacity or gear restrictions, and sunset provisions. Rather than modeling structurally the independent and combined eects of these restrictions, we will take a reduced form approach and leverage the fact that the ITQ asset price should capitalize this array of limitations and restrictions. By calculating the dividend price ratio in each shery over time, we are able to test whether property rights security aects investment in these assets. Table 1 .
While the general principle behind ITQs is the same in these countries, the governments have very dierent legal denitions of the quota share held by individuals; these imply palpable dierences in property rights security.
Arnason denes what he calls a Q-Value, which is a measure of the quality (or strength) of property rights in sheries. The Q-Value is a weighted index of assigned values for exclusivity, security, durability, and transferability, but in the current empirical setting the practical use of this index has limitations. Use of the Q-Value requires assigning values to each stick in the bundle for an individual country, and creating a weighted index of these scores to come up with an overall score for the property rights strength.
Prominent papers examining the eects of property rights on resource use include Watts and LaFrance (1994) and Libecap (1981) who look at grazing permits; Rucker, Thurman and Sumner (1995) who examine agricultural quota transfers; and Johnson, Gisser, and " This is not due to legal constraints, but rather the bank's willingness to accept a quota share as collateral. A recent exception in the United States is the ability of Alaskan shermen to leverage against IFQ holdings with some Seattle-based banks.
# Personal communication with Keith Buddy Guindon, April 6, 2009. are property for the purposes of the federal Banking and Insolvency Act $ . ITQs are in place in several sheries in British Columbia (see Table 1 ), but restrictions on trading were cited as a constraint on potential eciency gains in the halibut shery. That is, substantial long-run gains in eciency can be jeopardized by preexisting regulations and the bundling of the property right to the capital stock (Grafton, Squires, and Fox, pg. 679).
In New Zealand, explicit property rights are established in the creation of ITQs, and over the past 25 years nearly all commercial sheries have shifted to ITQ management. The right to a share of the catch is held in perpetuity, and when a program is discontinued, or where the allocation is changed by the regulator, shers are entitled to nancial compensation. Indeed, in the initial allocation of quota under the Quota Management System (QMS), allocations were in terms of tonnes, and the TAC was xed. When shery managers subsequently decided to lower the TAC, quota were bought back in an expensive scheme.
% This buyback will be discussed further and leveraged in the empirical strategy in Section 5. A list of the ITQ sheries studied in this paper is found in Table   2 .
Theoretical Background
Economic theory allows us to examine the value of secure property rights by using information inherent in the relationship between lease and sales prices of quota shares.
& In a competitive market the lease price of an ITQ should be equal to the expected economic rents from the current year. The lease price is given by
where r it represents the revenues and c it represents the economic costs in shery i and year t; the expectation operator, E t , simply reects the fact that revenue and cost need not be known with certainty for this simple analysis to apply. The sales price of an ITQ asset will capitalize the expected discounted rent streams. If rights are secure and held in perpetuity, the current sales price is
If the shery is operating in steady state, expected costs and revenues are constant over time. Then the ratio of the current lease price to sales price of an ITQ can be written compactly as pi0
. This ratio is commonly used in nance to test future expectations about earnings, to compare measures of asset value across geographically distinct markets, and to test for bubbles in asset markets (see, e.g., Campbell and Shiller, 1988 and Cochrane, 1991 In that literature, it is referred to as the dividend price ratio, to which we will conform here. Under the simple model above, the dividend price ratio should be a function of only the discount rate, δ. In particular, shery specic characteristics that aect revenues and/or costs conveniently cancel out of the dividend price ratio.
' However, the calculus above implies an innitely secure property right.
Suppose instead that participants in the market for quota share in shery i place some non-zero annual probability, θ, on the revocation of rights (e.g. the government discontinues the ITQ program or shuts down the shery).
In that case, the lease value remains unchanged, but the sales value (at time 0) is now given by
Again, if the shery is in steady state it is straightforward to show that the dividend price ratio is given by:
All else equal, less security about ownership in an ITQ program leads to a predictable eect on the dividend price ratio,R. Perhaps of more practical signicance, we can solve Equation (2) for the annual revocation probability, θ:
For example, suppose the dividend price ratio isR = 0.15 (a typical value from the ensuing empirical analysis), and that the relevant discount rate is δ = 0.05. These values imply an implied annual revocation probability of about 11%. Instead, ifR = 0.10, the annual revocation probability is about 6%. We can use Equation (3) to tease apart the implied strength of property rights in two dierent sheries with the same δ. The dierence between annual revocation probabilities in sheries i and j are given by:
which provides a convenient means to compare property rights strength across sheries.
In cases where ownership of an ITQ is considered a privilege and is not guaranteed in perpetuity, the sales price would be lower, while the lease price would remain unchanged. Similarly, if exclusivity of the right to a share of the TAC is attenuated by shery-specic characteristics,R would be high. All else equal,R should be lower where property rights are secure.
' A result that will become useful in our empirical specication.
The goal of this paper is to test the hypothesis that strong property rights lead to a lower dividend price ratio in the context of renewable resources. Using sales and lease prices from countries with varying strengths of property rights, we rst test for dierences in the dividend price ratio across countries. In that analysis we attempt to control for other dierences across countries and sheries and we leverage the insight that the dividend price ratio dierences out shery specic variables that might aect asset values. We then focus on dierences in dividend price ratios within countries, examining how shermen implicitly perceive the future value of quota holdings. Because ITQ programs are generally subject to federal laws that dene catch shares, it is dicult to obtain within-country heterogeneity in property rights security.
For within-country evidence, we exploit variation in the exclusivity of the property right across sheries resulting from enforcement of the property right (illegal harvesting) and neighboring jurisdictions that arise due to biological characteristics (migratory species). Furthermore, we exploit a policy shock to look for evidence that discounting behavior changed in quota markets following a high-prole buyback.
Data Description
We have compiled a unique panel dataset spanning hundreds of ITQ sheries in three countries. The primary variables of interest involve ITQ share sales and lease prices. Because data on individual transactions are generally not available, we use annual average prices for sales and leases of quota shares in three countries: Canada, the United States, and New Zealand. Variables that can aect the price of quota shares include the total allowable catch (TAC), ex-vessel prices, the market interest rate, and biological characteristics of the species. A detailed description of the data sources is available from the authors.
Data from New Zealand are the most comprehensive and come from FishServe, the New Zealand Seafood Industry Council, and the Ministry of Fisheries. For each species under quota management and for each management area, we have average annual prices for sales and leases, average greenweight tonnage prices, the total allowable commercial catch, and biological data from the Ministry of Fisheries and FishBase.
There is some variation within the United States in how catch shares have been implemented by regional management councils, but due to data limitations, we focus our attention on New Zealand.
In New Zealand, ex-vessel prices are not available for the entire time period. Following Newell et al (2005), we calculate greenweight tonnage prices using export price data for each year, and conversion factors from Clement and Associates.
In consultation with FishServe, a small number of observations are omitted from the analysis because they are believed to contain signicant errors. Including these observations does not qualitatively change our results.
Canadian quota prices are from management reports, Department of Fisheries and Oceans consulting reports implicit revocation probability in the Red Snapper shery is much higher, anecdotally supporting our hypothesis that weaker property rights raise the dividend price ratio. Of course, a host of factors could aectR, which we consider in the following section.
In Figure 2 and they tend to have higher ratios. The importance of exclusivity of property rights will be discussed further in the next section.
Empirical Results

Cross-Country Evidence
As described above, there is substantial variation in the property rights underlying ITQs across countries. It may be possible to qualitatively describe each property right characteristic for each shery, but comparing these property rights characteristics across sheries and countries is dicult. Here we take a more agnostic approach, estimating reduced-form equations to test for systematic dierences in property rights across countries. We augment our data set and attempt to carefully control for relevant shery-and country-specic characteristics. Once again, we make use of the observation that by dividing lease price by sales price, the dividend price ratio washes away many shery and country specic factors that aect the value of the shery.
The dependent variable throughout this section is the dividend price ratio of ITQs,R.
$ We exploit the panelstructure of the data and estimate country xed-eects, which we use to test the null hypothesis that there is no systematic dierence in dividend price ratios across countries. We estimate several equations, including controls for market conditions, biological characteristics, xed eects for species groups, and year xed eects to control for time-varying unobservables.
The most basic specication regressesR on country xed eects, species group xed eects, % and the market interest rate (in this case that country's 5-year Treasury rate in that year). The results are in column (1) of Table   3 . The results suggest that, on average,R in the United States is about 5.7 percentage points larger than in New Zealand.R in Canada is also signicantly larger than in New Zealand, and the dierence between the United States and Canada is signicant. In the second specication (column 2), we add year xed eects to control for unobserved contemporaneous shocks.
& In this case, the ratio in the United States is about eight points higher than in New Zealand.
Clearly there are other factors that could inuence the sales price of quota shares that are not included in the stylized model presented above. Expectations about the future harvest and ex-vessel prices would dictate future protability, and hence quota sales prices. We attempt to control for these expectations by including trends for harvest and ex-vessel prices. Specically, we control for the percentage change of this year's harvest from last year (in that shery), and the percentage change of this year's average ex-vessel price from last year.
Although species group xed eects are included in every specication, we alo add biological characteristics of each shery, which could inuence the horizon over which stocks rebuild. We control for years to maturity, length at maturity, and the maximum age of a species. Inclusion of these variables does not aect the main results, perhaps unsurprisingly because there is little variation in these variables within ISSCAAP species groups. Finally, the dynamics of a ratio within a shery over time suggest that the ratio of lease to sales prices decrease with the tenure of an ITQ program. For each shery, we include the number of years since the rst year of ITQ management. $ This variable was constructed using average annual sales and lease prices, which may introduce some measurement error into our dependent variable. Because our data are on an annual basis, we cannot take into account intra-year uctuations in lease or sales prices. Furthermore, because we are not constructing the ratio from individual transactions, we cannot observe whether any outliers (which may not represent arms-length transactions, for example) are included. To the extent that any measurement error is random (and uncorrelated with the independent variables), our estimates will be unbiased. % We use ISSCAAP species group classications to hold constant species-specic eects; there are 18 groups in the baseline specication.
We also include a quadratic term to account for nonlinear relationships, and each of these variables is interacted with country xed eects to allow this eect to vary across countries. In column (3), conditional on the control variables, the ratio in the United States is about 11 points larger than in New Zealand. In Canada, the point estimate indicates that the dividend price ratio is nearly seven points larger than in New Zealand.
As discussed above, New Zealand's Quota Management System includes many species not managed by ITQs in the United States or Canada. In column (4), we restrict the sample to include only New Zealand species with comparable counterparts in the United States or Canada. Specically, we restrict the sample to include only species in ISSCAAP groups 25, 31, 32, 33 or 34. These results are shown in column (4) of Table 3 . In this case, the point estimate implies that the dividend price ratio in the United States is thirteen points higher than in New Zealand.
Our cross-country results suggest that the dividend price ratio of ITQs is signicantly higher in the United States and Canada, where property rights governing ITQs are relatively weak. Rather than picking up the desired eect of property rights security, these results could be reecting a higher risk of collapse in US and Canadian sheries. While we have no empirical or anecdotal evidence that this is the case, we can test for it in our analysis.
In columns (5) and (6) we include a dummy variable for stock collapse; our results are robust to the inclusion of this variable, as well as alternative denitions of collapse or measures for the health of the stock.
' In column (6), our preferred specication, the dividend price ratio in Canada is about seven points higher than in New Zealand, and that ratio in the United States is nearly 14 points higher than in New Zealand.
The cross-country regression results suggest that ITQ sheries in the United States have a signicantly higher R. The ratio in the United States is higher than in Canada, which, in turn, is higher than New Zealand, though the results for Canada are not robust across specications. Because we are controlling for shery-specic characteristics and market factors, we argue that property rights strength explain the dierence in dividend price ratios across these countries.
In the next section we examine within-country evidence. The dependent variable is the ratio of the average lease price to the average sales price of quota in a management area. Each specication also includes, for each country, the number of years (and years squared) since an individual shery has been managed by ITQs. Collapsed equals 1 if that shery has current harvest levels less than ten percent of the historical maximum in our dataset. Standard errors (in parentheses) are clustered on country-year, and ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively.
Within-Country Specications
Migratory Species and Exclusivity
For within-country evidence, we examine more closely the data from New Zealand. While property rights characteristics such as disposition, use, and possession do not vary signicantly across sheries within New Zealand, there is substantial variation in exclusivity. This variation is not policy-induced, but rather is a function of the characteristics of the species. While some species do not move signicantly across space, several highly migratory species move in and out of New Zealand waters, where they are subject to shing pressure outside the control of the Quota Management System.
New Zealand waters contain tunas and other large pelagic species that migrate long distances seasonally, often outside of the country's Exclusive Economic Zone, into unmanaged international waters or into the waters of other jurisdictions. These species are characterized as highly migratory.
Because highly migratory species are subject to shing pressure that is unregulated by New Zealand's quota management system, the exclusivity of the ITQ right is arguably weaker than for species that stay within New Zealand's waters. This property right insecurity is driven by poor (or no) management in neighboring waters.
Our empirical approach formalizes the casual observation from Figure 2 that highly migratory species tend to have higherR. Table 4 provides within-country estimates for New Zealand. In these specications we are able to control for a host of factors, including 5-year Treasury yields, trends for catch and greenweight prices, time to maturity, length at maturity, maximum age, shery type (inshore, oshore, or shellsh) ! and whether or not the Ministry characterizes a species as recreationally or customarily signicant. In addition, we control for stockspecic revenue volatility, which captures both inter-annual uctuations in total harvest and product prices. In column (2) we include year xed eects instead of the interest rate. Depending on the control variables included,
In Table 2 , the fourth column indicates whether each species is classied as highly migratory.
New Zealand's sh production constitutes less than one percent of worldwide production, and exports (in terms of value) make up about two percent of overall international trade in sh products. Some stocks, however, are large on a worldwide basis. In these sheries the ex-vessel price is arguably endogenous. While we do not have a plausible instrument for ex-vessel prices, in alternative specications (available from the authors) we exclude these sheries. All of our results are robust to the exclusion of these sheries from the analysis.
! In this specication we do not include ISSCAAP category xed eects because they are highly collinear with the indicator for Highly Migratory Species. When included, though, the species group xed eects that include highly migratory species are jointly signicant.
R is between 0.8 and 1.1 percentage points higher for highly migratory species, supporting our hypothesis of the eects of property rights strength on the dividend price ratio.
Illegal Harvest and Insecure Property Rights
Evidence of illegal harvests in some stocks would suggest a weaker property right due to lack of enforcement. For each commercial species in the Quota Management System in New Zealand, the 2008 Plenary Report from the Ministry of Fisheries discusses any known evidence of illegal harvests. Of the 75 species with sucient data for the analysis here, there are six instances where signicant illegal takes are believed to occur. If shermen are also aware that some sh are illegally harvested from these stocks, it is plausible that they would place a lower value on the future value of quota holdings. In Table 4 , we also include an indicator variable equal to one if that species has been prone to illegal harvesting. The point estimates suggest that these stocks have dividend price ratios that are around three percentage points larger than for similar stocks.
Quota Buybacks and the Treaty of Waitangi
Finally, several policy changes in New Zealand between 1989 and 1992 may plausibly have impacted beliefs about ITQ security within New Zealand. In 1986, the initial allocations in the QMS system were in terms of tonnes, rather than as a percentage of the annual total allowable catch. When it became clear that the initial allocation was too high for many stocks, the Ministry of Fisheries proceeded to redene the right as a percentage of the total allowable catch.
" After much debate, the government honored the property rights by issuing a buyback of quota where the initial allocation was too high. As quotas were relatively new in New Zealand (and around the world), this action by the government likely served as a signal that it would treat quotas as legal assets. The buybacks began in 1989 and were nalized in the next two years.
Around the same time, there was a debate about how the Maori people, native New Zealanders, were being treated under the QMS system. The Maori people had traditionally relied on the ocean's resources, and there was a concern that the quota system did not take into account the signicance of the sheries to them. Since the inception of the QMS program, there was much controversy and dispute surrounding the treatment of native people under the sheries management regime. In 1992 there were concessions citing the Treaty of Waitangi of 1840, in which the Maori people were allocated 20% of the TAC for some key stocks. This policy decision formalized the government's The dependent variable is the ratio of the average lease price to the average sales price of quota in a management area. There are 992 observations in each regression. Heteroskedastic-robust standard errors are in parentheses, and ***, ** and * denote signicance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent levels, respectively. Each specication also includes type xed eects, corresponding to oshore, inshore and shellsh (freshwater excluded), as well as the time trends for number of years (and years squared) since an individual shery has been managed by ITQs. Revenue volatility is calculated as the standard deviation in real total revenue for that shery over all years in our dataset.
position and removed substantial uncertainty about the future of property rights in New Zealand sheries. We argue that this further strengthened security and would thus be expected to decrease the dividend price ratio. In column (3) of Table 4 , we estimate a regression with the same controls as in column (1), but also including an indicator variable that equals one for all years including 1992 and thereafter. The point estimate suggests that post-reforms there was a four percentage point decrease in the average dividend price ratio, controlling for interest rates and shery-specic characteristics.
Summary
The results within New Zealand provide further empirical evidence that the security of property rights aects quota asset values. Fisheries within New Zealand are governed by federal legislation, so we look to other sources of variation to test whether the security of property rights aects dividend price ratios of quota shares. While other factors are clearly important, such as market interest rates and the volatility of revenues for that shery, factors that strengthen or attenuate the security of property rights aect quota asset values. We nd strong evidence of a pecuniary eect of property rights strength, which suggests that the design of these institutions plays a critical role.
Conclusion
This paper provides the rst empirical evidence that stronger property rights lead to higher asset values and lower dividend price ratios (R) in ITQ sheries. Our cross-country evidence is based on descriptive accounts of ITQs as property rights in New Zealand, Canada and the United States. In our cross-country regressions, the point estimates suggest thatR for quota in the United States is nearly twice as large as in New Zealand. The averageR for quota in Canada is larger than in New Zealand in some specications, but these results are not as robust. Our estimates are consistent with the general view that ITQs as property rights are more secure in New Zealand than in North American sheries.
We then exploit important dierences in the exclusivity of property rights within New Zealand to test whether stronger rights lead to lower dividend price ratios. Where the exclusivity of the catch share is limited by migratory species or illegal harvesting,R is signicantly higher than other similar sheries, even when controlling for biological and other shery-specic characteristics. This lends insight into the importance of strong property rights, but also suggests that coordination across jurisdictions and better enforcement of these property rights might lead to lower implicit discount rates and greater quota asset values.
Several caveats should be mentioned. First, across countries, we cannot quantify the eects of component characteristics of property rights on asset values. Instead, we rely on country xed-eects and dummy variables to capture dierences in property rights security across sheries. However, our focus on sheries and the use of the dividend price ratio allows us to isolate the eect of country-specic institutions on investment in common pool resources. Second, our cross-country results could be consistent with systematic dierences in the probability of shery collapse across countries. To attempt to rule out this possibility, we control for trends in harvest and exvessel prices in our main specications and we control for whether an individual shery was collapsed in any given year. Our results are robust to the inclusion of controls for the state of the sh stock as well as market conditions and trends, but, as in any cross-country regression, other unobserved heterogeneity may still be inuencing our results. Third, our cross-country results could be consistent with credit constraints and non-collateralizable assets.
The dividend price ratio could be higher in the United States because of credit constraints and the inability to secure a loan for ITQ shares. This would simply be a mechanism through which insecure property rights aect asset prices. Finally, our results suggest that there is a pecuniary eect of property rights security, and if this result is present elsewhere (such as capital investment) the security of property rights are critical to sheries management.
On the other hand, if the only impact of property rights security is through quota asset values then the impact on social welfare is unclear, though the security of property rights would clearly aect the distribution of wealth.
Rights-based management in sheries can lead to signicant economic gains by eliminating the race to sh and providing private incentives to steward the resource. Our results suggest that stronger property rights lead to greater quota asset values. A closely related question concerns how property rights strength will aect dierent dimensions of investment in common pool resources (e.g. physical capital, environmental recovery, etc.). Indeed, these changes in investment may be partially responsible for the changes in asset values we observe. One implication may be that weak property rights decrease the incentive for good stewardship of the resource by increasing the average implicit discount rate in sheries. While we can only speculate on the underlying mechanisms, we hope that this research will help motivate future work on the eects of property rights security on the management, biological status, and sustainability of the resource itself.
